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Abstract: Existing research mainly focuses on the external impact of incentive policies of
industrialized/manufactured construction (IMC). However, it is still unclear how the transmission
mechanism among cities and regions of IMC incentive policies works in the process of
formulation. To fill the knowledge gap, this study establishes a relationship matrix to propose
the transmission-weighted complex network (TWCN). Degree distribution and clustering coefficient
are used to calculate the transmission path and the transmission intensity of TWCN. The validation
is based on data collected from 415 policy documents (2010–2018) and 2923 items from 181 nodes
of the TWCN for IMC policies. The findings show that transmission path of IMC incentive policies
is from the eastern coast of China to the central, western and northern regions. Fiscal and taxation
incentives have the greatest intensity of spatial agglomeration in the transmission process. The
results of the TWCN are consistent and conform to the scientific and rational expectations of research.
Overall, the research outcomes are applicable to studies on sustainability policies in different fields,
including sustainable construction, renewable energy, etc. Policy makers can implement the TWCN
to recognize the performance and functions of different incentives and propose effective strategies to
achieve sustainability.
Keywords: policy analysis; sustainable technology; incentive formation; complex network;
impact evaluation
1. Introduction
Incentive policies are the main deciding factors in achieving sustainable development, which
mainly include tax incentives [1], financial incentives [2], monetary incentives [3], and reward
incentives [4]. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) pointed
out that proper incentive policies could promote sustainable corporate growth [5]. The European
Union and its member states provide different incentives to make local sustainable development more
attractive [6]. Incentives were also demonstrated to facilitate sustainable urban development across
the United States [7]. Despite recommendations to use incentives to promote sustainable development,
it was mentioned that policy makers only focused on the effectiveness of incentive policies and did not
pay enough attention to the synergy of their transmission mechanism [8–10]. Studying the transmission
mechanism of incentive policies designed to achieve sustainability and appraising their effectiveness
could help policy makers better understand the efficiency of different solution options. Consequently,
decision-makers would benefit from the scientific analysis of the formulation and improvement of
relevant strategies.
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Studying the transmission mechanism of incentive policies for sustainable development has
become increasingly more important. The transmission mechanism for incentives refers to the
interactions and conduction laws of various incentive policies among different regions or cities
through proliferation [11]. In this study, a transmission mechanism for incentives is elaborated by
the transmission path and transmission intensity of each incentive among the cities and regions to
reveal the transmission laws. However, existing research mainly uses incentive policies as the carriers
of influencing factors to analyze their external influence on industries and markets. For example,
Kozlova et al. [12] analyzed the profitability of energy markets based on incentives for renewable
energy. Zhang et al. [13] observed consumers’ intention to purchase electric vehicles influenced by a
sustainable subsidy policy. Pleger et al. [14] suggested increasing public acceptance of market-based
spatial-planning policies by proposing effective sustainable policy frameworks. Nevertheless, none
of the above studies fully considered the internal role of incentive policies. There should be a
comprehensive analysis of the proliferation mode and broadcast role of incentive policies in the process
of formulation.
To fill this gap, this paper proposes the structure of a transmission-weighted complex network
(TWCN) and an experimental design to analyze the interactions and conduction laws of sustainable
incentive policies between cities and regions. Complex networks represent a new multidisciplinary
method for studying intricate systems [15], which can investigate the topological properties of systems
through statistical calculations of correlation features [16]. Therefore, this research attempts to answer
the question of how to use complex networks to analyze interactions and conduction behaviors of
incentive policies transferred between cities and regions. First, based on a systematic review of the
incentive policy text, we evaluated the system of intercity incentives and how they interrelate in
a small-world network. Next, the structure of the TWCN is proposed to explore the transmission
mechanism of interregional incentive policies from the perspective of transmission path and intensity.
Third, we take incentives for prefabricated building or industrialized/manufactured construction (IMC)
as an empirical case to systematically verify the functions and behaviors of the TWCN of incentive
policies, find potential problems in policy formulation, and provide improvements. Prefabricated
building or IMC, including residential, commercial, heavy civil, and industrial construction, help to
reduce wasted time and materials and promote sustainable operation in the construction industry.
Sources of research data on incentive policies for IMC are mainly policy documents published on the
official websites of local governments and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
from 2010 to 2018. Finally, to verify the reliability and feasibility of the TWCN design, we tested and
evaluated the research results through the use of correlation analysis and cluster analysis methods.
This research contributes to the body of knowledge in the following aspects: (1) construction of a
complex network based on the establishment of a relationship matrix, (2) analysis of the conduction
paths of incentive policies among cities and regions based on the strength of the network nodes, (3)
determination of accurate clustering coefficients to calculate and analyze the transmission intensity of
incentive policies, and (4) comparison of the analysis results with the external effects to evaluate the
results. The following sections include a literature review of the research background in studies on
incentive policies for influencing factors. The literature review uncovers the research question of how
to describe the interactions among the network nodes of the TWCN. The related areas of small-world
and scale-free network areas provide theoretical support for the TWCN framework. The methodology
section provides details of the relationship matrix, statistical parameters, and hypotheses. The data
collection, analysis, and outcome evaluation sections systematically elaborate the functions and
behaviors of the TWCN of incentive policies for IMC. The conclusion section explains the implications
for practice and society with recommendations for future research.
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2. Background
2.1. Previous Research on Transmission Mechanisms of Incentives
To further accelerate sustainable development and promote the transformation and upgrading of
the sustainable industry, governments in various regions and areas have taken relevant measures and
issued pertinent guidelines and supporting policies. However, certain problems occur in sustainable
development. For example, inconsistent standardization levels, high construction costs, and imperfect
technical systems of prefabricated building or IMC around the world [17–19]. Even though the
encouragement and guidance provided by various municipal administrations in financial, land and
tax incentives have a positive influence on upholding the development of IMC, decision-makers
and business practitioners are unsure how the sophisticated system of policies could benefit the
markets in various locations. Judging from the incentive policies announced or published in various
places for IMC, the policy measures are incomplete, the system has flaws, and the different incentive
policies issued by different local governments are similar regardless of their geographical location,
which indicates that there is a “transmission” effect among policy contents. Hence, it is important to
understand the feasibility and transmission mechanism of sustainable incentives in complex networks.
Previous research discussed incentive policies for sustainable development, with a broad range of
topics such as development status, policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Researchers
built theories on how incentive policies promote innovation development by analyzing the status quo
and existing problems of industry (or industry development). For example, Song et al. [20] analyzed
the situation and experience of the photovoltaic industry and proposed a series of incentive strategies
to help enhance development of the industry. Zou et al. [21] analyzed the development of China’s
green building and found that local economic fundamentals and subsidy-based incentive policies can
explain the presence of green buildings. Scholars have considered the influence of incentive policies in
the process of policy making from various factors. For example, Burns et al. [22] analyzed incentive
subsidies from the economic and financial perspective and stated that they could bring great potential
to the solar photovoltaic market. Kirakozian et al. [23] believed that the influence of emotional factors
and social interactions should also be considered in the process of formulating incentive policies.
Scholars also established a welfare policy network to establish the core position of the policy in the
decision-making process and achieve the goal of supporting policy formulation [24]. With regard to
the policy implementation phase, Aquila et al. [25] analyzed the pros and cons of incentives along
with their potential and vulnerability in the process of employment. Zhang et al. [26] established a
new dynamic energy policy system to regulate the behaviors of participants in technological progress
and avoid subsidy frauds. Scholars have conducted comparative evaluations and analyses on how to
stimulate the implementation of incentive policies and identified the problems [27].
Previous research on sustainable incentive policies mainly applied methods such as game
theory, stock model and system dynamics. Game theory is applicable to different subjects or
policies. For example, researchers optimized incentives for green energy and energy-chain efficiency
reform by formulating a game model between government, manufacturers and customers [28,29].
William et al. used the cooperative game theory framework to study the potential impacts of different
policy strategies with a stimulation of green infrastructure installation. They recommended the types
of policies that could be used to motivate private landowners to adopt green infrastructure [30].
Zhao et al. established an evolutionary game model to study the possible responses of enterprises
to the implementation of incentive policies related to carbon emission labeling. They used system
dynamics to simulate game scenarios [31]. Stock (or inventory) models help to examine the impacts
of relevant incentive policies on the main players. For example, Sarker established a consignment
inventory policy model for supply-chain systems and classified the systems from different perspectives
to understand the operational mechanisms of different consignment policies [32]. In addition, an
analysis of the influence of incentive contracts on entrepreneurs helped to select the amount of retained
equity so that all competitors could reach equity equilibrium [33]. System dynamics is widely used for
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the evaluation of incentive policies because of the availability of proprietary software. For example, a
sensitivity analysis was conducted to evaluate the rationality and effectiveness of incentive policies for
the photovoltaic industry. Guo et al. established a system dynamics model for the incentive policies and
considered the changes of economic and technical factors for model simulation [34]. Another research
project analyzed the effects of incentives related to the intermittent and uncertain nature of wind-power
generation on investment decisions by establishing a relevant system dynamics model [35].
2.2. Complex Networks
There are several commonly used models for studying complex networks, small-world networks
and scale-free networks and random networks. Newman and Watts proposed a small-world network
model to build a connection between regular and random networks [36]. They studied the distribution
of vertices, the average shortest distance, and the degree correlation using a small-world network. Later
improvements on the model included combinations of complex algorithms and models. For example,
Senkerik et al. studied the diversity of population development processes by combining complex
networks with chaotic-driven heuristic algorithms to construct diversity [37]. Huang established
an epidemic model based on complex networks and analyzed the spread of malware by studying
vulnerable nodes of weak and strong protections [38]. Wang et al. launched complex networks of
interactive transmissions to study the evolution of global imports of crude oil based on countries.
Their research introduced dynamic topological indicators and long-term global recursive graphs to
study global evolution and analyze the dependencies of countries on crude-oil imports [39]. Another
improvement on the complex network method is two-stage network construction, which can analyze
the relationships between listed companies and the stability of large companies [40]. To enlarge the
boundaries, researchers introduced a scale-free network model. The application of the scale-free
network model to the conduction paths of heterogeneous wireless-sensor networks was successful
and the established network could effectively improve the sensor performance and balance the energy
consumption of network nodes [41,42]. Another example of a scale-free network is a visual network
system based on weighted joint crimes to analyze the evolutionary relationship between criminals
which can provide better decision making for analysts with artificial intelligence [43]. These studies
provide theoretical support for this research and ideas for network design.
There are also many studies about dynamic of complex network in order to analyze the interaction
of different polices. In particular, the pining control, which drives a networked system to a coherent
state, can be used to the address cluster synchronization control problem for the reduction of network
burden and improvement of cluster synchronization efficiency [44–46]. Compared to the classical
method, the pinning controllability could be better characterized by the coupling range and convergence
speed in analytical and practical ways [47]. Moreover, a comparison with other networks at the same
scale identifies whether a network has the characteristics of a small-world network, comparing the
average path length (L) and average clustering coefficient (C) of two networks [48]. The average path
length reflects the degree of remoteness between two nodes. It is calculated by adding the shortest
distance between any two points in the network to obtain the average value. The average clustering
coefficient of the entire network is the arithmetic mean of the clustering coefficient of all nodes.
In past research, scholars used different governments, enterprises and clients as the research
subjects to carry out game theories of sustainable incentive policies, established the inventory model,
and built a system dynamics model to analyze the influences of the incentive policies on decision-making.
Furthermore, most of the transmission research on incentive policies only focus on the influences of
interest rates among different regions or countries [49,50]. All the above studies have explored the
external impact of incentive policies but have not fully considered the internal conduction laws between
different incentive policies. This knowledge gap represents the lack of a description of the transmission
mechanism among cities and regions (intercity or internode) of a complex network of sustainable
incentive policies. Hence, this research seeks to answer the question of how to use small-world and
scale-free network methods to analyze the functions and behaviors of incentive policies transferred
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between cities and regions. Therefore, this paper proposes to explore the transmission mechanism of
incentives from the perspective of complex networks.
The transmission path of incentives among regions or cities is analyzed to reveal its transmission
laws. Therefore, this study analyzes the transmission path of an incentive policy by comparing the
strength of the node. The strength of the node is reflected by the reference quantity and cited quantity
of policy documents. As shown in Figure 1, nodes A and B both propose the same incentive policy.
There must be a policy transmission relationship between the two nodes. Node A issues the policy
earlier than node B. Therefore, the incentive policy proposed by node A is referenced by node B. The
outbound value of node A is equal to the ingress value of node B. The greater the output value of node
A, the greater its reference rate in the incentive policy transmission in the network. Conversely, the
greater the ingress value of node B, the higher its incentive rate in the network. If a complex network
is composed of N nodes, there are always incoming and outgoing relationships similar to the one
between A and B for those nodes, which eventually form a chain of conduction paths. [51]
Figure 1. Node conduction diagram.
The transmission intensity of incentives among regions or cities is analyzed to reveal its degree of
spatial agglomeration. In this research, the clustering coefficient value reflects the spatial concentration
of incentive policies. The clustering coefficient refers to the coefficient of the degree of node aggregation.
If the value of the clustering coefficient of a node is larger, the effect of the incentive policy in the
region (or city) is more significant. On the contrary, the smaller the clustering coefficient value, the
weaker the influence of the incentive policy. Additionally, classification and decomposition of incentive
policies can disclose the spatial agglomeration of various policies, thus deeply exploring the policy
characteristics introduced in different regions.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data Collection
Prefabricated building or IMC are more energy-efficient, sustainable, productive, and cost-effective,
and less wasteful than traditional in situ construction, which is an important transformation direction
for sustainable development of the construction industry. Despite the many proven advantages over
conventional site-built construction, the adoption of prefabricated building is slow in the face of
dire challenges in the construction industry [52]. Policy makers in cities of China have formulated
many incentive policies for sustainable development of prefabricated building. As of 2018, policies
were issued by 181 cities in China to promote the sustainable development of prefabricated building.
Looking carefully at the documents on the incentives, there is a high degree of similarity among
the policies issued. Table 1 lists the top 24 most frequently used incentives and frequency of cities.
Meanwhile, we find that policy makers actually learned from other cities’ policies in the process of
formulation by field investigation and interviews. Therefore, we take the interaction of incentive
policies among cities as a case for the TWCN to observe how they are transmitted.
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Table 1. Numbers of incentives in cities. VAT, value-added tax; R&D, research and development.
Incentives Frequency ofCities Incentives
Frequency of
Cities Incentives
Frequency of
Cities
Project awards
or subsidies 127
Quality margin
offer 48
Consumer
differentiated
credit support
35
Adopt
assembly type,
give first-rate
support
95 Enterpriseaward 43 Land transfer 33
Prioritize land
use indicators 93
Farmers’ wage
security 41
Included in
land supply
plan
32
VAT levied on
new wall
materials
83
Land
protection for
construction
39 Invitation totender 32
3% plot ratio 82 Land transfermethod 38
Qualification
support 32
Consumer
provident fund
loan limit
80 Base bonus 37 Bond financing 31
Preferential
policies for
high-tech
enterprises
52
Special funds
for
energy-efficient
building
37 Arbitrage 30
R&D funding
support 49
Financial green
channels 36
Personnel
training 27
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The data source for IMC includes a discussion of implementation opinions, official government
websites, and the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development. The keywords for policy search
include implementation opinions, operation plans, and development strategies of assembly-type
building, building industrialization, and industrial modernization to retrieve relevant policy documents.
In this study, 415 policy documents from 2010 to 2018 were extracted at the provincial and municipal
level, with a focus on data on the incentive policy parts. This research adopted the induction method
and grounded theory to classify and sort original text data and form a systematic theoretical code. After
classification and coding, the TWCN system had 2923 items from 181 nodes regarding IMC incentive
policies. Table 2 shows the specific results from data collection after the following detailed steps:
1. Extract the keywords from the collected incentive policy texts to form initial codes. The synonyms
mentioned in the documents are merged repeatedly and sorted to form the theoretical codes,
which become the IMC incentive policy elements.
2. Sort and classify the extracted theoretical codes. The main purpose is to combine similar factors.
For example, value-added and deed taxes are grouped into tax policies; provident fund loans and
bond financing are grouped into financial policies.
3. Continuously screen the incentive policy texts until there are no new theoretical codes. This
follows the saturation principle of grounded theory.
4. Organize theoretical coding data and build a coding system of incentive policy elements. After
statistical analysis using Cronbach’s alpha, this step divides the incentive policies into seven
aspects (shown in Table 2), including tax, finance, land, administration, construction, and
research–development–training (RDT), and the number of key elements and nodes are counted.
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Table 2. Coding system of incentive policy elements. RDT, research–development–training.
N First Level Meaning Second-Level Classification
1 Tax (37)
Refers to tax concessions
paid by enterprises or
individuals through tax
reduction and exemption
Value-added taxes (VATs) refunded upon collection
(83), preferential treatment for high-tech enterprises
(78), research and development expense deduction
(60), quality margin discount (48), farmers’ salary
margin discount (41)
2 Banking (26)
Refers to government’s
financial allocation to
reward or subsidize
enterprises, projects, and
production bases
Project award compensation (127), total investment
in parts and components of construction included in
progress measurement (60), preferential treatment
for high-tech enterprises (52), research and
development fund support (49), enterprise award
compensation (43)
3 Land (20)
Refers to
government-provided
construction land policy
guarantee
Prioritized land use index (93), 3% floor area ratio
award (82), construction land guarantee (39), land
supply by transfer (38), installment payment of land
transfer fee (37)
4 Finance (17)
Refers to financial
institutions providing
credit, financing, etc., to
enterprises or consumers
Consumer provident fund loan line (80), opening a
green channel (36), consumer differentiated credit
support (35), certain credit support for
base/project/enterprise (32), bond financing (31)
5 Administration(7)
Refers to administrative
support provided by
government for
enterprises, such as
examination and
approval procedures,
qualification
management, and credit
bonuses
Signs included in admission system (12), priority
given to pre-evaluation support (95), optimized
approval procedures (56), qualification support
given (32), credit bonus given (16)
6 Constructionlink (21)
Refers to government’s
support for logistics,
bidding, etc., in bidding,
construction, operation
and other aspects
Logistics and transportation support for ultra-large
and ultra-wide construction (83), encouragement of
general contracting mode (44), inviting public
bidding (32), application for pre-sale permit for
commercial housing in advance with construction
site reaching ±0.000 and capital more than 25% of
total investment (24), priority can be given to
pre-sale permit for commercial housing to achieve
design image progress (17)
7 RDT (16)
Refers to provision of
talent training, scientific
and technological
achievement
transformation,
laboratory construction,
and other incentives
Encourage striving for higher-level funds (27),
personnel training (27), inclusion support (22),
laboratory construction support (22), achievement
transformation support (20)
Notes: The numbers in brackets in the first-level classification column represent the number of second-level
classification policy entries. The numbers in brackets in the second-level classification column represent the number
of nodes referring to the incentive policy. With limited length, this paper lists only the top five policies in the
second-level classification. Based on reference to provincial and ministerial level documents by ministerial level
documents, 181 nodes include provincial capitals, prefecture-level cities, cities under separate state planning,
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government, excluding Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Macao.
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In the policy formulation process, policy makers often refer to and draw on relevant policy
plans and policy concepts from other countries, regions, or departments. Therefore, this study makes
the following assumption: the government departments that formulated the IMC incentive policies
referred to previous relevant IMC incentives. The study used the Java program to calculate the
relationship matrix among intercity IMC incentive policies, and UCINET to analyze the relationship
matrix. Figure 2 shows an example of the relationship matrix for the connections between geographical
locations when they adopt a particular IMC incentive policy. In this case, the policy is 3–5% floor area
ratio in the tax policy. The topological structure of the transmission network for this incentive policy is
shown in the figure.
Figure 2. Example of transmission topology.
3.2. Design of TWCNModel
To explore the mechanisms of incentive policies, we designed a research method based on the
path and intensity of policy transmission. Figure 3 shows the structure of the proposed TWCN. The
first step of the proposed solution is to collect data on the incentive policies, which is then processed
using the induction method and rooted theory. The next step is to construct the TWCN through the
established relationship matrix, followed by statistical feature analysis. After the analysis, the research
continues with the transmission characteristics and rules of the incentive policies based on an analysis
of their conduction paths and intensities. Meanwhile, correlation and cluster analysis methods are
used to evaluate the effects of TWCN to verify its reliability. The results of TWCN research are suitable
for decision making with reasonable recommendations.
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Figure 3. Structure of transmission-weighted complex network (TWCN) design.
3.3. Theoretical Details
Function G(Vn, En, Wn) for TWCN includes city node set Vn = {vi, I = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n}, city contact
edge set Em = {e(i, j), i, j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , m}, and network weight set Wn = {w(i, j),i,j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n}. Node vi
represents the city and edge e(i, j) represents the transmission relationship between the same incentive
policy elements. The weights on the edges of the network (edge weight w(i, j)) represent the numbers of
incentive policy transmission entries among cities. There are interactive transmissions among multiple
incentive policies in many cities. The following matrix constructs the relationships between intercity
incentive policies (w(i, j))
W =

0 w12 · · · w1n
w21 0 · · · w2n
...
...
. . .
...
wn1 wn2 · · · 0

Equation (1) calculates the average of nodes <k>, which is the average of all the nodes in
the network.
< k >=
1
N
N∑
i=1
ki (1)
where n is the number of nodes and ki is the number of nodes connected to the ith node.
Distribution function p(k) calculates the node degree distribution, which is an important geometric
feature in a complex network. It represents the ratio of the number of nodes with node degree k to
total nodes. The degree of probability of any node is exactly k. The degree distribution of a complex
network is close to the scale-free distribution in reality: p(k) = k−r.
Equations (2)–(7) calculate the characteristics of a small-world network. Equation (2) calculates
the average path length where di j is the shortest distance of the sum of the weights on the path between
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nodes vi and v j. Equation (3) is the average clustering coefficient, where ci represents the aggregation
coefficient of node i. Equations (4) and (5) compare the target network with other random networks,
all of which have the same scale. The target network is a small-world network when Equations (4)
and (5) are satisfied. Equations (6) and (7) calculate Lrand and Crand, respectively, which represent the
average path length and average clustering coefficient of random networks at the same scale.
L =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i, j
di j (2)
C =
1
N
∑
i∈N
ci (3)
L ∼ Lrand (4)
C > Crand (5)
Lrand = lnN/ ln(k) (6)
Crand = (k)/N (7)
Equations (8) and (9) analyze the transmission path for TWCN. There are two parameters, outward
strength and inward strength. Outward strength or output strength (souti ) refers to the number of nodes
connected by the arrow direction from the ith node. Input strength (sini ) refers to the number of nodes
with the arrow direction connecting to the ith node.
The out-degree of node i is souti =
N∑
j=1
wi jdi j (8)
The in-degree of node i is sini =
N∑
j=1
w jid ji (9)
where si represents the strength of the i th node and wi j is the weight of node i relative to node j.
Equation (10) analyzes the transmission intensity. Assuming that node i has ki edges connected to
other nodes in a complex network, the node has a median of ki. The maximum value of the number
of sides of the node and the corresponding node is expressed as Mi, then Mi =
ki(ki−1)
2 . The actual
number of edges of the node is mi. The agglomeration coefficient of a node is the ratio of the actual
number mi and the maximum number of edges Mi, which is represented by ci.
ci =
mi
Mi
=
2m
ki(ki − 1) (10)
3.4. Hypothesis
To verify the validity and rationality of the TWCN design, we selected the strength value of the
transmission network of sustainable incentive policies as the dependent variable for the evaluation of
results. The strength can reflect the cited situation of the incentive policy in the process of transmission.
The greater the value of the out-degree, the more significant the effect of the incentive policy (or the
target node) on the other nodes. The next hypothesis test is to select the external indicator that affects
the research object as the independent variable. Bivariate correlation analysis between the external
indicators and the achievement evaluation indicators can explain whether there is a linear relationship
between the two. The goal is to extract the indicators with significant correlation as the final external
factors of the evaluation. The subsequent spatial agglomeration clusters the final external factors from
previous statistical tests and finds the collection characteristics. The cluster characteristics become
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the input to compare with the TWCN analysis results. If the analysis results from both TWCN and
clustering analysis are the same, it proves that the TWCN research method is reliable and sensible.
4. Results
4.1. Characteristic Analysis of the IMC incentive policies
The statistical characteristics were analyzed with regard to node strength distribution and
small-world characteristics of the TWCN for IMC incentive policies. The TWCN exhibits a long-tail
characteristic in the logarithmic coordinates of the nodes’ distribution curves of out-degree and
in-degree, which obeys the power law distribution. Figure 4a shows the out-degree distribution of node
strengths of the TWCN; Figure 4b shows in-degree distribution of node strengths of the TWCN. Hence,
incentive policies created by a few initiators (i.e., regions or cities) are cited by the rest. Furthermore,
the complex network has scale-free characteristics.
Figure 4. (a) Out-degree and (b) in-degree distribution of the transmission-weighted complex
network (TWCN).
To determine whether a network has the characteristics of a small-world network, we compared
the average path length L and average clustering coefficient C with two random networks Lrand and
Crand at the same scale. Table 3 shows the calculation results. The clustering coefficient of the complex
network is 0.508, which is higher than that of the same size stochastic network (0.401). The average
path length is 1.476, which is close to 1.214, the value for the same size stochastic network. Therefore,
the TWCN network has the small-world characteristics.
Table 3. Comparison of small-world and TWCN networks.
Number of Nodes Total Number ofEdges
Average Clustering
Coefficient
Average Path
Length
Small-world network 181 15,487 0.508 1.476
Stochastic network 181 15,487 0.401 1.214
4.2. Transmission Path Based on Degree Distribution
The strength of connections between TWCN nodes reflects the features of the transmission path.
The out-degree and in-degree, respectively, represent the reference quantity and cited quantity of IMC
incentive policies. Table 4 shows examples of the calculation results, which are divided into sections,
with the number of nodes counted.
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Table 4. Node distribution of out-degree and in-degree intervals.
Out-Degree
Intervals Node Examples
In-Degree
Intervals Node Examples Total Nodes
>800
Jiangsu Province, Wuhan,
Zhejiang Province, Yunnan
Province, Shaoxing, Nanjing,
Suqian, Changzhou, Jiangxi
Province, Chuzhou
13 >600
Panjin City, Chengde City,
Xuchang City, Guyuan City,
Baotou City, Luoyang City,
Qiannan City, Jinzhou City,
Jiangmen, Erdos City
16
400–800
Rizhao, Xuzhou, Suzhou,
Hebei Province, Zhuha,
Ningxia Hui Autonomous
Region, Taizhou, Fuzhou,
Huzhou, Zhengzhou.
41 300–600
Yinchuan City, Baiyin City,
Bijie City, Yuxi City, Guiyang
City, Zhangzhou City,
Zhumadian City, Siping City,
Zhanjiang
64
<400
Yueyang, Gansu Province,
Xiangyang, Tongchuan,
Guizhou Province,
Changchun, Anqing,
Lvliang, Tongling, Jiyuan
127 <300
Foshan, Dalian, Yangquan,
Hebi, Hangzhou, Haikou,
Zhangjiakou, Changde,
Yiyang, Hainan Province
101
Based on the transmission path analysis of IMC incentive policies, there are 127 nodes with fewer
than 400 out-degree intervals, indicating that more than 70% of the 181 network nodes have a low
quote rate. There are 13 nodes with more than 800 out-degree intervals, among which the eastern
coastal areas (such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces) have seven nodes, indicating that these are
the principal nodes in the transmission process. There are 101 nodes with fewer than 300 in-degree
intervals. Among them, the eastern and central regions have more nodes, 34 and 22, respectively,
compared to other regions. There are 64 nodes with 300 to 600 in-degree intervals. Among them, the
eastern coastal and central regions have 12 and 16 nodes, respectively. Overall, the IMC incentive
policies in the eastern coastal and central regions are more active than those in the northern and
western areas. Among the 16 nodes with more than 600 in-degrees intervals, the northern region has
five nodes. However, the out-degree values of these five nodes are less than 400, indicating that policy
innovation in the region is low. In the western region (such as Guizhou and Gansu) and northeast
region (such as Heilongjiang) the out-degrees are mainly less than 400 and in-degrees are mainly less
than 300, indicating that these regions are less influenced by IMC incentive policies. In addition, the
local governments of these regions are unwilling to implement such policies.
To identify the transmission routes, the following analysis integrated the key incentive elements
in Table 2 and the distribution of out-degree and in-degree nodes in Table 4. Projects awarded is one of
the most frequently quoted incentive policies for fiscal subsidy. The data show that this aspect was
first mentioned in Shanghai and then disseminated to 26 provinces and cities (shown in Figure 5a).
Jiangsu Province was the earliest initiator of total investment in IMC in progress measurement (shown
in Figure 5b). It also has supporting policies of rural and affordable housing renovation projects.
Shanghai was the first city to propose the policy of special funding for energy conservation of buildings
(shown in Figure 5c). Hunan was the first province to propose including the IMC incremental charge in
the construction cost (shown in Figure 5d). The transmission routes of IMC policies started from these
initiators and spread to the neighboring coastal regions of Zhejiang, Hubei, and Jiangxi Provinces,
which introduced them and then conveyed them to the northern region (e.g., Hebei and Shanxi
Provinces) and western region (e.g., Shaanxi Province). For other financial types of incentive policies,
Shandong Province was the first to propose the policies of base award (Figure 5e), subsidy (Figure 5f),
and prefunding supervision (Figure 5g). Afterward, 19 provinces and cities referred to base awards
and subsidies. However, only Hubei, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Guangdong Provinces referred
to the supervision policy of prefunding (Figure 5f). The transmission routes continued with Jiangxi
Province (Figure 5g), which was the first to emphasize a preferential policy to attract investment.
Then northeastern regions such as Heilongjiang and Liaoning Provinces cited this policy and western
regions such as Sichuan and Tibet followed.
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Figure 5. Transmission paths of fiscal incentive policy: (a) project award; (b) total investment of
industrialized/manufacturing construction (IMC) in progress measurement and rural/affordable housing
renovation; (c) special fund for building energy conservation; (d) fabricated incremental cost included
in construction cost; (e) base award; (f) subsidy and prefunding supervision; (g) investment attraction.
Another way to recognize the transmission routes is by analyzing incentive policies related to land
use. Jiangsu was the first province to propose incentive policies by giving priority to land-use indices,
such as a 3% plot ratio incentive, land supply by transfer, and land transfer installment payment,
in addition to land supply allocation, bidding, auction, and hanging out shingles for land supply.
Figure 6a shows that these policies are cited the most frequently by following provinces and cities
in their subsequent incentive policies. For example, after seeing the satisfactory results of land-use
policies, Hunan first introduced a 5% plot ratio (Figure 6b), which was later cited by Sichuan, Qinghai,
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Shaanxi, and other western regions to further strengthen the basis of the 3% plot ratio reward proposed
by Jiangsu. Figure 6c shows that Zhejiang was the first province to recommend the land supply plan
policy, which was subsequently cited by 26 provinces and cities. Nevertheless, the policy does not
include an implementation plan. To improve operability, Shanghai started excluding construction
areas for precast exterior wall panels (Figure 6d), accompanied by eastern coastal areas (such as Jiangsu
and Shandong) and northern regions (such as Hebei and Beijing).
Figure 6. Transmission paths of land use policies: (a) 3% plot ratio; (b) 5% plot ratio; (c) land supply
plan; (d) excluding construction area for precast exterior wall panels.
The adoption of taxation policies is vigorous due to their generalizability. Figure 7a shows the
transmission paths of VAT refund policies for new wall materials, which have the highest citation rate
of all incentive policies. For example, Hebei Province first made a motion on a taxation policy for
new wall materials, which was then cited by 26 other provinces and cities. Figure 7b shows that other
taxation policies with high citation rates were initiated in Jiangsu Province; for example, preferential
treatment for high-tech enterprises, deductions for research and development expenses, quality margin
discounts, farmers’ salary margin discounts, decoration cost tax discounts, performance bond benefits,
performance bond discounts, wall reform fund/bulk cement fund discounts, and urban infrastructure
construction preferential fees benefits. Overall, the transmission paths of IMC incentive policies show
how sustainable incentive strategies proliferate from initiation to transformative practice. The data
show that the policies first appeared in the eastern coastal areas (such as Jiangsu, Shanghai, and
Zhejiang) and gradually expanded to the western and northern regions.
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Figure 7. Transmission paths of tax incentive policies: (a) VAT refund for new wall materials; (b) other
preferential tax policies.
4.3. Transmission Intensity Based on Clustering Coefficient
The clustering coefficient of TWCN reflects the tight connection between adjacent nodes. The
larger the value, the more frequent the interaction among nodes, leading to greater intensity of
incentive policies. Due to the policy hierarchy, the introduction of policy documents by various
regional governments is affected by the application of provincial and ministerial policy documents.
To analyze transmission intensity, we used the mean method to deal with the calculated clustering
coefficient value of each node, which is categorized under provinces, municipalities, or autonomous
regions. Figure 8 shows the transmission clustering coefficients of IMC incentive policies, confirming
that fiscal and taxation policies have relatively larger clustering coefficients (0.6–1.4) than the rest of the
coefficients illustrated in Figure 4a. The connections between these nodes are relatively more frequent
than the rest as well, indicating that all provinces and cities in China pay more attention to these types
of incentive policies than other types. Furthermore, Figure 8 shows that the clustering coefficients of
finance, link of construction, and RDT policies are smaller than the rest, mainly concentrated between
0 and 1. These clustering coefficients specify that the connections between nodes are weak, indicating
that the governments of these areas are less willing to issue incentive policies for IMC. Hence, the
implementation of these policies is very limited in these areas.
Figure 8. Transmission clustering coefficients of IMC incentive policies.
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The following spatial agglomeration features of IMC incentive policies describe the small-world
transmission mechanism of the network. Figure 9 utilizes GIS visualization results to map the relative
agglomeration characteristics of the various types of incentive policies in geographic regions. Based
on policy coding in Figure 9 and Table 2, the following discussion explains the key incentives in the
transmission process.
Figure 9. Spatial agglomeration of IMC incentive policies: (a) financial; (b) tax; (c) link of construction;
(d) land; (e) money and banking; (f) administration; (g) RDT.
Figure 9a shows the spatial agglomeration of fiscal policy. Guangdong Province and other
eastern coastal areas, together with Henan and other central areas, as well as northern areas, have
greater transmission intensity than the rest of China. Examples of the most cited fiscal policies
include rewarding or subsidizing IMC projects, enterprises, and bases; encouraging investments
to integrate component parts into total construction; giving preference to high-tech enterprises
(especially prefabricated building enterprises); specifying funds for the construction of building energy
conservation; and providing financial support for rural and affordable housing projects.
Further analysis of Figure 9b shows that as far as the tax policies are concerned, most areas show
great transmission intensity and more than 30 kinds of taxes are investigated. Especially the eastern
coastal areas, such as Jiangsu and Shandong Provinces, together with the western regions, such as
Shaanxi and Yunnan Provinces, demonstrate high transmission intensity. Examples of repeatedly
cited tax incentives include preferential treatment for high-tech enterprises, deduction of research
and development expenses, tax discounts for quality margins, discounts for farmers’ salary margins,
discounts for new wall materials, discounts for decoration costs, discounts for performance bonds, and
discounts for wall reform fund/bulk cement funds.
Figure 9c shows the spatial agglomeration of construction link policies. This type of incentive
mainly involves the stages of inviting and bidding, construction, and operation. The transmission
intensity in Hunan, Henan, Hebei, and Liaoning is strong. Among them, Hunan has mainly issued
incentives in terms of obtaining commercial licenses for housing sales in advance, invitations to bid, and
priorities in bidding. Henan, Hebei, and Liaoning have mainly focused on incentives for transportation
and exemption of shutdown for taking turns on pollution days. For example, some small industrial
plants are forced to shut down on certain weekdays to reduce the pollution in the surrounding areas.
Usually these plants take turns temporarily closing for one or two days a week. The exemption policy
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allows IMC companies to continue production and construction, which helps to improve productivity
and reduce wasted time.
Figure 9d shows the spatial agglomeration of land policies. Chongqing has the greatest impact on
the policy transmission process. Guangdong, Yunnan, the northwestern areas, and the eastern areas
have less impact on policy transmission. Beijing and Shanghai have little impact on policy transmission.
The land policies are mainly reflected in building area, plot ratio, and way-of-land granting.
Figure 9e shows the spatial agglomeration of financial policies (specifically loans and banking).
Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Shanxi have a significant impact on policy transmission.
On the other hand, Qinghai, Tibet, Beijing, Fujian, and Shanghai have almost no impact on this type of
policy. Incentives in financial policies involve consumer credit and corporate credit. Consumer credit
includes preferential treatment for concessional loans, mortgage loans, loan quotas, and interest rates.
Corporate credit supports lending and opens up green channels for finance.
Figure 9f shows the spatial agglomeration of administrative policies. Policies with a substantial
amount of citations mainly support appraising enterprises that adopt prefabricated building, optimizing
the approval procedure in applications for declaration, and giving certain support to the application
of qualifications.
Figure 9g shows the spatial agglomeration of other RDT policies. This type of policy encourages
enterprises to strive for higher-level funds, train talent, and add new laboratories and construction for
R&D platforms. RDT policies are cited on numerous occasions in the transmission process of IMC
incentive policies. However, this type of incentive policy lacks details and criteria, with no specific
practical measures proposed in the entire nation; hence, it has low operability.
4.4. Outcome Evaluation
For verification and validity of the TWCN analysis results, the outcome evaluation of this research
starts with an analysis of the out-degree results of IMC incentive policies using the TWCN analysis to
generate indicators of achievement evaluation. We selected 13 cities according to their geographical
location, as shown in Table 5, and created corresponding nodes in the TWCN. Then we calculated the
out-degrees of the 13 selected cities and analyzed the transmission effects of their incentive policies.
The first and second columns of Table 5 show the results of the high output values; the third and fourth
columns show the medium-level values; and the fifth and sixth show the medium-to low-level values.
Based on the spatial agglomeration of these 13 nodes, the out-degree value of the IMC incentive policy
is generally concentrated in the eastern region (e.g., Wuhan in Table 5), followed by the central region
(e.g., Kaifeng), and the smallest in the northwestern (e.g., Baotou), southwestern (e.g., Guiyang), and
northern (e.g., Ankang) regions. The transmission path of incentive policies goes from the eastern
region with a large output value to the central region, and then to the northwestern, southwestern, and
northern regions. The TWCN analysis of the selected data verifies the same results as the transmission
paths identified in Section 4.3.
Table 5. City-level output values using TWCN.
Node Out-Degrees Node Out-Degrees Node Out-Degrees
Wuhan 1054 Kaifeng 459 Ankang 266
Zengzhou 613 Nanning 442 Xi’an 210
Nanchang 593 Anqing 365 Baotou 181
Yangzhou 580 Lu’an 323 Guiyang 47
Kunming 41
This paper uses the strength of the nodes obtained from the TWCN analysis as the dependent
variable, and the indicators related to the development of IMC as independent variables. The first
hypothesis states that the development degree of IMC in each region is positively correlated with
the intensity of the incentive policy. In other words, the better the development of prefabricated
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building, the greater the cited rate of the local incentive policy. To verify the accuracy and confirm the
analysis results, we continued the calculation using the TWCN based on the previously selected 13
cities. Moreover, since the announcement of the Guidelines for the Office of the State Council on the
Development of Prefabricated Building by the State Council on 27 September 2016, local governments
have successively issued instructions on the implementation of IMC or assembly buildings in response
to the call of the state. The guidelines and instructions acknowledge that the development of IMC
is an important part of the transformation and upgrade of the construction industry in China at this
stage. Yet, the IMC practices started relatively late. The statistics of relevant data are still incomplete
and uncomprehensive. In the existing official statistics, IMC is included in the statistics of relevant
indicators of the construction industry. Therefore, this research uses the relevant indicators of the
construction industry as variables to explain IMC development. Table 6 shows the relevant index data,
including the total output value of the construction industry (X1), the added value of the construction
industry (X2), the number of construction enterprises (X3), the construction area of the construction
enterprise (X4), and the completed area of the construction enterprise (X5) as explanatory variables.
The prefabricated building node out-degree strength (Y) is analyzed by the explanatory variables.
Table 6. Relevant indicator data.
Node y1
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
(100 Million Yuan) (100 Million Yuan) (Unit) (10,000 m2) (10,000 m2)
Wuhan 1054 8067.78 1087.41 1376 50,084.32 14,635.43
Zhengzhou 613 3494.5 566.2 1654 23,771.98 4409.32
Nanchang 593 3183.86 551.58 731 16,308.6 6343.53
Yangzhou 580 3915 340.34 657 27495 10,650.2
Kaifeng 459 352.37 125.02 302 1976.48 946.38
Nanning 442 1185.21 409.61 422 7955.52 1842.88
Anqing 365 223.24 101.87 291 1583.7 976.8
Luan 323 173.08 93.6 137 1229 631
Ankang 266 149.23 115.44 136 1220.91 349.47
Xi’an 210 3304.54 938.3 1055 13,491.49 2553.1
Baotou 181 210.26 8.75 113 1466.25 343.44
Guiyang 47 2064.71 502.61 320 9579.57 2062.15
Kunming 41 2945.82 707.44 1307 10,132.03 3313.49
Sources of data: Figures in the table are derived from the Statistical Yearbook of the National Bureau of Statistics of
2018 and the Statistical Yearbook and Statistical Bulletin of the National Bureau of Statistics of 2018.
Table 7 shows the correlation analysis of each factor with the strength of the transmission node
of the incentive policies. When the significance level is 0.05, the sig. values are 0.659, 0.777, and
0.779, corresponding to the total output values of the construction industry (X1), the construction
housing area of the construction enterprise (X4), and the completed area of the construction enterprise
(X5), respectively. The correlation level is significant. The values of the indicators added value of the
construction industry (X2) and number of construction enterprises (X3) are 0.351 and 0.410, respectively,
which do not meet the requirements of the critical values of the correlation coefficient. Therefore,
this research uses the indicators total output value of the construction industry (X1), the construction
housing area of the construction enterprise (X4), and the completed area of the construction enterprise
(X5) to explain the node strength of the incentive policies.
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Table 7. Correlation analysis.
Y X X2 X3 X4 X5
Y
(Unit)
Pearson correlation 1 0.659 * 0.351 0.410 0.777 ** 0.779 **
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.014 0.239 0.164 0.002 0.002
X1
(100 million yuan)
Pearson correlation 0.659 * 1 0.871 ** 0.785 ** 0.972 ** 0.921 **
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.014 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
X2
(100 million yuan)
Pearson correlation 0.351 0.871 ** 1 0.817 ** 0.753 ** 0.637 *
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.239 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.019
X3
(Unit)
Pearson correlation 0.410 0.785 ** 0.817 ** 1 0.720 ** 0.582 *
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.164 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.037
X4
(10,000 m2)
Pearson correlation 0.777 ** 0.972 ** 0.753 ** 0.720 ** 1 0.958 **
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.000
X5
(10,000 m2)
Pearson correlation 0.779 ** 0.921 ** 0.637 * 0.582 * 0.958 ** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.000 0.019 0.037 0.000
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
To find the node strength, this research uses the bivariate correlation coefficients on the total
output value of the construction industry (X1), the construction area of the construction enterprise
(X4), and the completed area of the construction enterprise (X5) for the influence of incentive policies.
Table 8 shows the results of linear fitting performed by SPSS 25.0 software. R2 of the linear fitting
model of X1, X4, and X5 is 0.434, 0.604, and 0.608, respectively. The corresponding sig. values are all
below 0.05, which indicates that the correlation level is significant. The resulting linear fit curves are
shown in Figure 10 for the completed area of the construction enterprise, the construction housing
area of the construction enterprise, and the total output value of the construction industry as the
independent variables. The strengths of IMC incentive policies are positively correlated. The incentive
policies encourage the growth of the construction area, completed area, and total output value of the
construction industry.
Table 8. Fitting results.
Dependent Variable: Node Strength (Y)
Model Summary Parameter Estimates
Equation R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1
Linear of X1 0.434 8.444 1 11 0.014 218.763 0.080
Linear of X4 0.604 16.782 1 11 0.002 205.128 0.015
Linear of X5 0.608 17.032 1 11 0.002 212.844 0.049
Figure 10. Fitting results of policy node strength for (a) construction industry total output value and
assembly building; (b) construction site area and prefabricated building; (c) building construction
enterprise completed area and fabricated building.
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This research implements cluster analysis to verify that the spatial agglomeration of the selected
13 nodes for IMC development is consistent with the results of complex network analysis. Table 9
shows the calculation results of the analysis carried out on indicators X1, X4, and X5. Based on the
results in Table 9, the results of cluster analysis are divided into four categories. Nanchang, Yangzhou,
and Wuhan are in the first category. They are mainly in the eastern areas, in Hubei, Jiangsu, and
Jiangxi Provinces. The cities of Lu’an, Kaifeng, and Anqing are in the second category. They are in
the central area, in Anhui and Henan Provinces. Zhengzhou, Nanning, Ankang, and Baotou are in
the third category. Kunming, Guiyang, and Xi’an are in the fourth category. The third and fourth
categories are in the southwestern, northwestern, and northern regions (Shaanxi, Guizhou, Yunnan,
and Inner Mongolia). According to the out-of-range value in Table 2 and Figure 11, the clustering
result is larger in the first category because the intensity is greater than 500. The clustering result is
decreased in the second category with a concentration between 300 and 500. For the clustering results
in the third and fourth categories, the outswing values are mainly concentrated below 300. Therefore,
from the results of cluster analysis of geographical regions, incentive policies for IMC are declining
according to region, with the largest in the east, the second largest in the central region, and the least in
the northwest, southwest, and north. The previous complex network analysis results are consistent
with the correlation analysis of the samples, which confirms the scientific validity and rationality of the
TWCN method.
Table 9. Cluster membership.
Case 4 Clusters 3 Clusters Case 4 Clusters 3 Clusters
Wuhan 1 1 Anqing 4 3
Nanchang 1 1 Luan 3 3
Yangzhou 1 1 Guiyang 2 2
Xian 2 2 Kunming 2 2
Baotou 2 2 Nanning 2 2
Zhengzhou 2 2 Ankang 1 1
Kaifeng 3 3
Figure 11. Cluster analysis results.
5. Discussion
Based on the transmission mechanism of IMC incentive policies, this research scrutinizes the macro
and micro perspectives of transmission path and intensity for sustainable industrial policies. From a
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macro perspective, the TWCN establishes a law of regional differentiation based on the issuing time
and the contents of intercity IMC incentive policies through complex network analysis. Meanwhile,
among the 293 prefecture-level cities in China, 33% cities have not released incentive policy documents
for IMC. In particular, the western regions (such as Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Tibet, and Xinjiang) and
northeastern regions (such as Heilongjiang and Jilin) have only issued provincial-level or relevant
documents in their provincial capitals. This indicates that these areas are still in the wait-and-see stage
regarding the development of prefabricated building or IMC. Their incentive policies have not been
issued yet. However, in the eastern coastal areas (such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shandong) and other
central areas (such as Anhui, Henan, and Hunan), basically all cities have issued relevant documents
on IMC incentive policies. At present, there are still noticeably insufficient IMC incentive policies in
various provinces and cities in China. It is necessary to formulate policies with operable details for
different stages of development in different regions. In areas suitable for promotion, the suggestion is
to pinpoint pilot areas for active promotion and systematically increase the proportion of prefabricated
building or IMC in newly built residential buildings. Another suggestion is to encourage and conduct
pilot projects in potential areas to gradually realize nationwide coverage of IMC.
At the level of transmission intensity, we explored the spatial agglomeration characteristics of
incentive policies from the aspects of finance, taxation, land, money and banking, link of construction,
and administration. We diagnosed the key incentive elements of different policy content in each
geographical area. The TWCN analysis shows that there are specific policy incentives and penalties for
financial, taxation, land, and RDT aspects. This is attractive to enterprises or individuals who are IMC
stakeholders. Particularly, the TWCN analysis shows greater policy transmission intensity of financial
and tax incentives, land area, and plot ratio awards than other incentive policies. As for financial and
administrative policies, there are insufficient indicators in China. The characteristics of specific rewards
and penalties are difficult to achieve due to the unclear indicators proposed by governments, which
indicates that local governments do not value these incentives as important. The suggestion is that the
governments should further elaborate IMC incentive policies and measures and establish relevant
incentive measures for financial and administrative aspects. Then, policy makers can strengthen and
refine the aspects of standards and systems, administrative examination and approval, publicity and
training of incentive content to promote IMC. Concurrently, researchers and policy makers should
carefully examine the specific values for quantifiable indicators before proposing or announcing them;
for example, the precise proportion of the loan quota for consumer provident funds and the exact
value of incentives or subsidies given for fabricated buildings.
We explored the transmission process of IMC incentive policies through a comparative analysis of
the strength of the complex network to determine the spatial transmission paths. The results show
that there is a high rate of transmission of IMC policies in finance, taxation, and land. These policies
were introduced in the eastern coastal areas (e.g., Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang) and then gradually
spread to the surrounding areas, including the central, western, and northern areas. The policy contents
of various regions (e.g., Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Guangxi) focus
on finance, administration, and links of construction. This indicates that these regions have issued
relevant policy documents but failed to achieve the incentive effects. For areas where the development
of prefabricated building is lagging behind, the suggestion is to learn from the experience of areas with
better development. Attention should be focused on detailed incentive policies, including economic
incentives such as finance and taxation and practical subsidies. In addition, regions should study their
local conditions to formulate relevant incentives. For example, cities in the west can consider national
preferential policies for their development; areas with high pollution in winter (such as Hebei and
Henan) may give preferential treatment for nonstop work.
6. Conclusions
This paper proposes the TWCN design, which is an analytical method for complex networks
based on textual data of sustainable incentive policies. The research focused on the question of what
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the internal conduction laws are between incentive policies. To examine IMC incentive policies in
China, we first formulated factor codes by text analysis based on the collected incentive texts of the
past 10 years. Then, we implemented the factor codes as experimental data to create connections.
The next step was to program the experimental data to establish the complex network model for
the transmission mechanism of IMC incentive policies. By calculating the node strength, clustering
coefficient, and other statistical characteristics, we deeply analyzed the transmission mechanism of
IMC incentive policies from the aspects of transmission path and transmission intensity. In order to
verify the validity and rationality of the experimental method, we used the TWCN analysis results as
independent variables, and the correlation index of the IMC development as the dependent variable.
The results from the selected samples are consistent with the TWCN analysis results, which confirms
the reliability of the method. It is feasible to use the TWCN method to study the transmission of
sustainable incentive policies.
The design of the TWCN sheds light on the transmission mechanism of incentive policies between
cities and fills the theoretical gap of quantitative description of the dynamic paths of strategy influences.
We proposed a novel research idea for text and content analysis and proved its feasibility at both
the micro and macro level. In addition to evaluating the effects of new industrial incentive policies,
the TWCN is suitable to study the transmission laws of interest rates for monetary policies, stock
exchange rates for market monitoring, and exchange price differences for exploration of business
opportunities. From the practical value perspective, using cities as observation points to study the
transmission of sustainability policies can help to find the elements that policy makers focus on
when introducing relevant procedures. Studying the transmission paths of sustainable incentive
policies can reveal the laws of how different types of policies disseminate geographically. When
decision makers formulate the relevant mechanisms of rewards and penalties, they can implement
the TWCN to recognize the performance and functions of existing policies. Using existing local and
outside policies as references, decision makers can expansively consider the actual conditions and
propose effective strategies to ensure the sustainability of policies. Additionally, the TWCN analysis
discloses unsatisfactory situations in incentive policies for research, development, and training (RDT)
for sustainability in industries. Government funding agencies could foster the sustainable development
of IMC by investing in research grants and encouraging researchers and educators to explore the
related areas.
As with any study, the article at hand suffers from several limitations that are worth consideration
for further research activities. First, we collected data on the relevant policies, guidelines, and
regulations published on official governments websites in the past 10 years. Future research should
ensure the comprehensiveness of data collection and take into account the openness of policies
announced by government departments. One possible expansion of data availability is to study the
incentive policies by in-depth interviews to gain a complete understanding of the intentions. Secondly,
we studied the transmission path and intensity of incentive policies between cities in China based on
TWCN. However, the differences in economic, environmental, political and social factors of individual
cities were not taken into account when establishing the relationships among cities and regions. Thus,
we would consider the above factors to optimize the model of TWCN in further research. Thirdly,
this paper used published policy texts as the research data, but it is difficult to make a reasonable
prediction for cities that have not issued the policy. As the volume of research data increases, TWCN
network nodes will increase greatly. Future research will introduce the complex network evolution
models or related algorithms to construct a dynamic TWCN model to study the dynamic transmission
characteristic of incentive policies among cities and regions.
Furthermore, building upon and extending the research finding in the context of prefabricated
building, future research could also expand the sample data on incentives of other countries, especially
between close neighboring countries where develop similar incentive policies. Moreover, it should be
noted that this study focuses on the transmission of incentive policy content between cities and regions.
In future research, we would also consider interactions between different actors such as policy makers
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and implementers/practitioners to explore social network characteristics due to knowledge sharing in
policy making, and then research the influence of consolidating arenas for knowledge sharing and
discussion at the policy level among different regions.
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